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Islamic charity already has a bad image 
in much of the non-Muslim world, even 
among the generally well informed. 
Certainly during the 1980s Afghan 
conflict and the early 1990s Bosnian 
conflict, a number of Islamic charities, 
especially those founded in the petro-
dollar states, engaged in activities that 
pursued a mixture of humanitarian, 
religious, political, and sometimes mili-
tary aims. It is less often remembered 
that the United States government 
actively supported the mujahidin in 
Afghanistan until 1989, and closed its 
eyes to some arms shipments to their 
successors in Bosnia, until in both cases the honourable “combatant” 
was transformed into the hostile “terrorist.” As regards the years imme-
diately preceding 9/11, evidence of support by some Islamic charity 
managers for the Chechen mujahidin is fairly strong. Direct support for 
Al-Qaida type activities by charities as such has been strongly suspect-
ed by the U.S. authorities, but seldom, if ever, proved to the standard 
required by Western criminal courts. As regards the period since 9/11, 
evidence of the activities of controversial Islamic 
charities is equivocal as to mixed aims, and always 
needs to be treated with caution because of the 
risk of observer bias.
Charities are always vulnerable to abuse be-
cause they rely on trust. Moreover, many Muslims 
involved with charity still subscribe to a “seam-
less” view of jihad, according to which humanitar-
ian, religious, political, and even military aims are 
fused. Their defence—in which there is more than 
a grain of truth—is that the Western devotion to a 
pure domain of charitable altruism is hypocritical. 
For the Western aid system is deeply connected 
to national foreign policies and security concerns: 
humanitarian action often provides a fig-leaf for 
military intervention, Christian missions proselyt-
ize in many parts of the world, some unfortunate 
populations are reduced to “exporting” images 
of their misery through the Western-controlled 
media and thus becoming aid economies—and 
so on. In any case, a strong tradition may also be 
identified within Islam that admires and enjoins 
selfless charitable giving for the benefit of the dis-
advantaged. Moreover, a general trend is observ-
able among Islamic charities towards accepting that the charitable sec-
tor ought to accept strict disciplines in return for the privileges that it 
enjoys, which include tax exemptions and the relatively free mobility of 
both funds and employees. Yet politically sophisticated Muslims won-
der whether the present U.S. and Israel administrations actually want 
to allow a healthy Islamic charitable sector to realize its potential.
The rise of Islamic NGOs is the result of a confluence of two historical 
movements both of which date back to the 1970s. One was the rise 
of NGOs in general. The second was the Islamic resurgence, which we 
may trace back to the time of the Arab defeat by Israel in 1967. Islamic 
charities all have a family resemblance: for instance in their drawing 
on the potent religious idioms of zakat 
(mandatory alms) and waqf (the Is-
lamic charitable foundation), in their 
references to the religious calendar 
and quotations from the Quran and 
Hadith, and in their special concern for 
orphans and refugees.
The association of Islamic charities 
with transnational mujahidin, despite 
its wide geographical spread, will 
probably be looked back on as a short-
lived historical episode. Of course, vio-
lent movements will continue to find 
ways in the future to equip themselves 
with weapons. But the charity sector is 
under increasing scrutiny by watchdog organizations such as the in-
ternational Financial Action Task Force (FATF), by national regulators, 
and by banking compliance officers. Many alternative channels exist 
whereby clandestine funds may be transferred: trade, tourism, labour 
migration, hawala, cash couriers, and bank remittances between indi-
vidual account holders. The attack on Islamic charities since 9/11 has 
had the unintended consequence of driving money underground 
where regulators have no control over it.
Dubious scholarship
One manifestation of this overreaction is the growth of a new disci-
pline, counter-terrorist studies. Anyone who travels by air or train must 
be grateful that police and counter-terrorist professionals are continu-
ously trying to protect us by piecing together networks of suspicious 
activity through analysis of financial transfers, personal meetings, elec-
tronic communications and the like. This is a sad sign of the times. But 
is it necessary to dignify the publication of such analysis, fortified by 
extracts from heavily biased intelligence websites, with the authority 
of major university presses?1 Such books disrespect the normal re-
quirement that serious social researchers should check their informa-
tion from different sources, make allowances for their own prejudices 
and those of informants, and situate their findings in a broad political 
context. Two recently published books of this kind on Islamic charities 
allow no voice whatever to the charity workers themselves or their 
beneficiaries. Smearing of a bona fide charity’s reputation can seriously 
wrong its trustees and staff, and destroy their ability to help the people 
for whom it was set up.
Dubious scholarship of this kind also supplies the expert testimony 
to support the U.S. government’s assault on Islamic charities through 
the law. Whereas in Britain a number of Islamic charities operate suc-
cessfully under the regulation of the Charity Commission, virtually all 
major Islamic charities in the United States have been closed down. 
Some of these cases are the subject of civil and criminal trials still in 
process, and it would be premature to comment here. (Likewise, one 
British Islamic charity set up to bring aid to Palestinians, Interpal, has 
been designated as a terrorist entity by the U.S. government. Though 
highly regarded by most aid professionals in Britain and already twice 
cleared of wrongdoing by the Charity Commission, it is currently being 
reinvestigated by the Commission.) However, it is hard not to see the 
way the U.S. government treats Islamic charities in general as of a piece 
with two other blots on the reputation of the most legalistic country in 
the world: Guantánamo and extraordinary rendition.
The title of this article may be tempting fate. 
The British counter-terrorist services have 
reported that the financial trail leading to the 
7 July 2005 attacks on London included direct 
or indirect links to eight unspecified charities. 
A single major terrorist outrage anywhere in 
the world, clearly funded through abuse of an 
established Muslim charity, would decisively 
blacken the reputation of the whole sector. 
However, from the evidence available at the 
time of writing, one of the repercussions of 
9/11 has been hyper scrutinization of Islamic 
charities by the United States government that 
uncomfortably recalls the McCarthy period.
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Muslim NGOs
in the world (widely respected even in the USA) is able to channel the 
generosity of Muslim donors into worthwhile aid programmes, and 
also benefits from a certain degree of special access in majority Mus-
lim communities. I have been able to verify this by observing Islamic 
Relief’s development work in a remote district of northern Mali, where 
the Tuareg local coordinator and an all-Malian staff have established 
an impressive rapport in their mission to help the most vulnerable. It is 
well established that international Christian NGOs can work effectively 
in Christian parts of Africa through local church networks, and there is 
surely considerable potential for international Islamic charities to work 
in a similar way among Muslims.
Moreover, back in Britain, Islamic Relief offers an excellent example of 
practical integration with the mainstream non-Muslim aid and develop-
ment agencies. This has been called “dialogue on the ground.” Islamic 
Relief has also launched an ambitious project called the Humanitarian 
Forum, which sets out to build bridges between different humanitarian 
cultures. Obviously there is a considerable difference between a British 
charity—Muslim or other—and, say, a Saudi charity: for instance, on is-
sues relating to gender. However, politicians and diplomats should not 
fall back on the easier option of talking only with people who already 
agree with them. This is the trap into which fall too many well-meaning 
organizers of conferences devoted to dialogue and toleration.
Because of political turbulence, the immediate outlook for projects 
such as the Montreux Initiative and the Humanitarian Forum is not 
unclouded. It is significant that even in Saudi-Arabia and Kuwait, with 
all their wealth derived from oil, private charities are now tightly re-
stricted in sending funds overseas for relief aid—apparently because 
of fear of contravening U.S. foreign policy. All charities have difficulty in 
remitting funds to the Palestinian Territories through the banking sys-
tem. However, if we look further ahead it is clear both that faith-based 
organizations in general are gaining more attention in development 
circles, because of their access to vast civil society networks, and that 
private philanthropy is becoming a recognized adjunct to the interna-
tional aid system. There is no good reason why Islamic charities should 
not play a valuable role, not only at the local and national level, but also 
in due course on a par with the major international NGOs—which are 
likely to be so important to our future as a counterbalance to the power 
of nation-states and multi-national corporations.
Take the case of the refusal of the USA to grant a visa to Tariq 
Ramadan, the well-known Swiss Muslim intellectual. The root 
of the problem may be that he is regarded in some circles as 
a radical. However, he has consistently condemned terror-
ism and is accepted as an interlocutor by many prestigious 
academic institutions, and as an important voice for mod-
eration by some political leaders. The grounds for excluding 
him from the USA seem skimpy. He was refused a non-im-
migrant visa in September 2006 by the American consulate 
in Bern, on the grounds that he had made donations to a 
Swiss charity set up to help Palestinians, the Association de 
Secours Palestinien (ASP). These donations, amounting only 
to some 1,700 Swiss francs in all, were made between 1998 
and 2002, whereas it was not until August 2003 that the 
U.S. Treasury designated ASP as terrorist entity. The govern-
ment’s position is that Ramadan ought to have known that 
it was a terrorist entity.
Strengths of Islamic NGOs
Under Swiss law, ASP was operating, and is still permitted 
to operate today, as a charitable organization, which Ram-
adan says he had no reason to suspect in any way. The U.S. 
government’s assumption in black-listing it, unsupported by 
evidence, seems to have been that ASP was supplying material support 
to Hamas; and this raises a vital legal point. The USA regards Hamas 
as an indivisible entity. It would seem to ignore evidence which sug-
gests that, if ASP was sending funds to zakat committees and similar 
organizations in the Palestinian Territories, these were, in turn, distrib-
uting funds in the normal way of charities: on the basis of need. All 
these charities are regulated by the Palestinian Authority, and the zakat 
committees in particular by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Survey 
evidence suggests that they enjoy a high degree of popular trust and 
approval, being run with minimal administrative costs and having unri-
valled grass-roots knowledge about the needs of the most vulnerable.
But even supplying funds to a zakat committee for life-saving medi-
cal technology, or emergency food aid, is considered equivalent to an 
act of terrorism by the U.S. government, if it is satisfied that there is a 
personal connection of some kind with Hamas. This seems a strange 
position. Many observers infer that, unwilling to appreciate the distinc-
tion between a nationalist movement and internationalist extremism 
of the Al-Qaida type, the U.S. government is determined to impose a 
kind of martial law extending even to efforts to alleviate the miseries 
of Palestinian non-combatants. But America boasts a strong tradition 
of civil rights advocacy, which is providing a legal counterbalance. The 
mainstream American non-Muslim charities initially failed to react to 
the closing down of most of the big American Muslim charities after 
9/11, but are now realizing that the steps taken against the latter have 
implications for the whole charitable sector.
It seems likely that the scapegoating of Islamic charities originates 
from a very high level in the U.S. administration, and will not contin-
ue forever. Islamic charities in many countries, though sceptical as to 
whether any actions they take will change the American political posi-
tion, are coming to accept that they have much to gain from improving 
their standards of professionalism and accountability. The Montreux 
Initiative, a project sponsored by the Swiss government in 2005 but 
carried forward by Muslim as well as non-Muslim experts, is attempting 
to help bona fide Islamic charities dissolve the obstacles facing them. 
The solution proposed is voluntary self-regulation at the technical 
level, overseen by a board of eminent persons acceptable to all par-
ties. Involvement in this process makes it more likely that such chari-
ties will move towards embracing principles such as transparency and 
non-discrimination when they have not done so already. The Montreux 
Initiative does not, however, suggest that those Islamic charities which 
combine religious with humanitarian aims should be disqualified for 
that reason from admission to collegial relations with the international 
aid community, any more than Christian evangelical charities such as 
World Vision or Tearfund should be so excluded. With so much suffer-
ing and distress in Muslim countries it is inevitable that Islamic charities 
should focus on alleviating it. However, widely accepted international 
codes of conduct insist that, within a given community of aid benefici-
aries, there should be no discrimination in favour of co-religionists.
A successful organization such as Islamic Relief Worldwide, founded 
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